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Abstract 
Syntactical1 treatments of propositional attitudes are attractive to artificial intelligence researchers. 
But results of Montague (1974) and Thomason (1980) seem to show that syntactical treatments 
are not viabk. They show that if representation languages are sufficiently expressive, then axiom 
schemes characterizing knowledge and belief give rise to paradox. Des Rivikres and Levesque 
(1988) characterize a class of sentences within which these schemes can safely be instantiated. These 
sentences do not quantify over the propositional objects of knowledge and belief. We argue that their 
solution is incomplete, and extend it by characterizing a more inclusive class of sentences over which 
the axiom schemes can safely range. Our sentences do quantify over propositional objects. o 1998 
Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. 
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1. Syntadcal treatments 
Knowledge, belief, desire, intention and other propositional attitudes have propositional 
objects. Concerning the nature of these objects there seem to be two main possibilities. 
One is that they are representations of some kind: perhaps sentences of a language, or 
pictures, or other devices for representing. Call the view that propositional attitudes are 
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relations between individuals and sentences the syntactical view. The other possibility 
is that attitudes have as their objects not the representations themselves, but instead the 
represented states of affairs, meanings, or propositions. This is the semantical view. 
The syntactical view has seemed attractive to researchers in artificial intelligence (see 
Chapters 2 and 8 of [5]). For one thing, it is natural to represent the knowledge and 
beliefs of a computer program by writing sentences representing facts that are known or 
believed. For another, syntactical treatments can be formalized in the classical predicate 
calculus, which is the lingua franca of knowledge representation [9,13,14]; since there 
is good theorem-proving technology for this language (e.g., [l-3]), such treatments lend 
themselves directly to implementations. Attractive as they may be, though, syntactical 
treatments face a serious theoretical difficulty. As we shall see, Richard Montague 
[12] shows that if the language in which known facts are represented is sufficiently 
expressive, then familiar axiom schemes characterizing knowledge are inconsistent. He 
argues that knowledge can be given a syntactical treatment only on pain of triviality. 
Richmond Thomason [16] argues under similar assumptions that a syntactical treatment 
also trivializes belief. 
Montague and Thomason obtain their limiting results by instantiating their axiom 
schemes with self-referential formulas. In response, Jim des Rivibres and Hector Levesque 
[6] show that syntactical treatments are viable if these axiom schemes are instantiated only 
with what they call regzdar formulas. This result is a good start. But syntactical treatments 
will be more useful if it can be extended, since regular formulas are rather restricted in 
their expressive power. For one thing, they do not quantify over the sentences that, on a 
syntactical treatment, are the propositional objects of the attitudes. Such quantification 
is needed to express matters that it may be useful for automated agent to know. To 
take just one example from natural language processing, it is widely recognized that 
participants in cooperative dialogue will say only what they believe to be true, and will 
make their conversational contributions as informative as possible [8]. That a speaker 
conforms to these maxims of conversation is naturally expressed, assuming a syntactical 
treatment, by quantifying over the sentences he utters. It is not expressed by any regular 
formula. 
Our result, which extends that of des Rivieres and Levesque, shows that such 
quantification does not pose a special problem for syntactical treatments. We show that the 
schemes of Montague and Thomason can without paradox be instantiated with formulas 
that quantify over the propositional objects of the attitudes. We shall proceed as follows. 
First, in Section 2, we discuss the difficulty with syntactical treatments of propositional 
attitudes. After introducing a language with self-reference, and the axiom schemes of 
Montague and Thomason, we reproduce their negative results. In Section 3, we present 
the limited positive result of des Rivibres and Levesque concerning regular formulas. We 
also show, by elaborating on the example from natural language processing, that it can 
be useful to instantiate the axiom schemes with formulas that quantify over propositional 
objects. In Section 4, we show how to extend the result of Section 3 to cover such formulas. 
Finally, in Section 5, we present a further extension. 
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2. Knowledge and belief 
To bring out the difficulties with syntactical treatments, the language for representing 
attitudes must have resources for self-reference. These are provided here by arithmetiza- 
tion. 2 We introduce the following language of arithmetic. 
Definition 1 (The language of arithmetic). CO is a first-order language which includes a 
set of individual variables x , y , . . .; a set of individual constants a, b, c, cl, Q, . . . including 
the special constant symbol 0 (zero); a set of predicate symbols P, R, . . . including the 
special unary predicate N (to be interpreted as the set of natural numbers); and function 
symbols S (the successor function), + (addition) and x (multiplication). The terms and 
atomic formulas of Co are defined in the usual way, as are the formulas formed with the 
connectives A, V, +, -, and quantifiers 3 and V. 
In the following, we shall consider only languages which extend Lo. The following 
definition concerns what can be regarded as terms denoting formulas: 
Definition 2 (Giidel numerals). Let L be a language and p E L. Letting g(p) be the Godel 
number of QC (according to some fixed scheme), rlpl is the Lo-numeral 
g(q) times 
z? 0. 
We can regard [pl as a term standing for the formula lo. Now the following definition 
introduces the relation symbol with which we shall express propositional attitudes as 
relations to formulas. 
Definition ?I (The language of the attitudes). L, is the language whose vocabulary is that 
of LO, together with the special dyadic relation symbol (11. 
We shall refer to the formulas of La using lower case Greek letters: $, I++, x etc. Below, 
a! will represent either knowledge or belief. Thus, 01~ ([VI) expresses that the agent a has 
attitude cx toward sentence q; just which attitude (11 represents will be clear from the context. 
When we are not interested in them we shall suppress the agents, writing simply m( rql). 3 
Now we can characterize knowledge and belief as follows: 
Knowledge axioms 
Interpreting o( [(pl) as the claim that the agent knows p, tbe following axiom scheme 
expresses the facticity that distinguishes knowledge from belief and other propositional 
attitudes: 
(9 (+4-d) + p. 
2 Nothing depends essentially on this. The paradoxes discovered by Montague and Thomason and our responses 
to them can be discussed while obtaining self reference using other techniques. 
3 In 13, we can, for example, write Vx(utter(speaker, x) + aspeaker(x The intended interpretation f this 
sentence is that he speaker utters only what he believes to be true. 
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Other schemes express that the agent knows certain things, and that its knowledge is closed 
under certain logical operations. Thus: 
(ii) o(]NcPl) + bol) 
expresses that the agent knows that what is known is true. The axiom scheme: 
(iii) o( rbol), 
for each (p that is a logically valid formula of the first-order predicate calculus, expresses 
that the agent knows logic. Finally: 
(iv) o( TV + *l) + [a( r~l) + a(rlcFi)] 
expresses the assumption that the agent’s knowledge is closed under modus ponens. 
To facilitate the coming discussion, for any set S of formulas let K(S) be the set of all 
instantiations of schemes (i)-(iv) with formulas q and I++ of S. 
Belief axioms 
Interpreting a( [co]) as the claim that the agent believes (p, scheme (i) is unacceptable. 
Beliefs can be false. Belief is characterized by axiom schemes (ii)- above together, 
perhaps, with positive introspection: 
(v) a( rd) + a( bmmi). 
This scheme expresses that the agent is cognizant of his own state of belief: if he believes 
something, then he believes that he believes it. Let B(S) be the set of all instantiations of 
schemes (ii)-(v) with formulas of S. With this background in place, we are in a position to 
see the difficulty with syntactical treatments. 
2.1. The d$ficulty with syntactical treatments 
Generalizing Tarski’s [ 151 demonstration of the undefinability of truth, first Montague 
[ 121 and then Thomason [ 161 proved results that seem to show that propositional attitudes 
can be given syntactical treatments only on pain of triviality. Let Q be a single axiom 
for Robinson’s arithmetic (see, for example, [ll]). For any (perhaps complex) monadic 
predicate /3 of ,CU, let QB be the result of relativizing quantifiers to /I. 4 For any set r of 
formulas, let Ts be the set of all closed formulas, or sentences, of r. Montague proved the 
following theorem about syntactical treatments of knowledge: 
Theorem 1 (Montague5 [12]). Let I’ be a$rst-order theory such that lc(LL) 5 r, and 
such thatfor some monadic predicate B, Qs E r. Then r is inconsistent. 
4 If b(w) is a monadic predicate, the rdativization of cp to /3, (o fl, is defined for arbitrary (o by recursion: 
if cp is atomic, qfl is q; (-cp)p is +; (p -+ +)p is qfi + ll,fl, and so on; finally, replacing /I, if need be, 
by an alphabeti; variant that does not contain the variable x, (V.xq)@ is Vx(x(B[x/w) + @) and (3x(p)~ is 
W/w/~) A (0 ). 
5 Io fact Montague proved a stronger result involving, instead of axiom scheme (iv), the inference role: if 
r+a(r(4+@1)andrE a(rvlLthenr~a(r@l). 
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Montague-s result seems to show that someone who supposes arithmetic is true cannot 
coherently suppose an agent’s knowledge is characterized by the relevant schemes, if 
knowledge is; given a syntactical treatment. Thomason extended Montague’s result to the 
case of belief: 
Theorem 2 (Thomason [16]). Let r be afirst-order theory, a(~$) G r and, for some B, 
Q@ E r. Then, foraD p!r, r kcr([Qsl) + c~(r@l). 
Thomason’s result seems to show that someone who supposes arithmetic is true cannot 
suppose that an agent believes arithmetic, without supposing that the agent is perfectly 
credulous. He must suppose that such an agent believes everything, if belief is given a 
syntactical treatment. 
The upsh’ot for knowledge representation is that, on a syntactical treatment of 
propositional attitudes, one cannot add to a knowledge base all instantiations of axiom 
schemes (i)-(iv), or of (ii)-(v). To do so will, under unobjectionable further assumptions, 
make the knowledge base inconsistent. Our response to these results will be to guarantee 
consistency by limiting the scope of axiom schemes (i)-(v). We shall allow them to be 
instantiated only within a limited part of the object language. That is, we shall characterize 
a somewhat limited set of unproblematic sentences, within which these schemes can safely 
be instantiated. 
3. A partial solution 
The first response of this kind came from des Rivieres and Levesque [6]. They showed 
that the schemes characterizing knowledge and belief can safely range over what they 
called reguZar sentences. In this section we define this set and state their result. To this end, 
we first sligh.tly extend C, . 
Re-definition 1 (The language of the attitudes). We add to the earlier Ca, for each i > 1, 
a relation symbol oi of arity i + 1. (We now write “al” for “cr”.) 
Informally, one argument place is for the agent, one is for (the Gijdel numeral of) a 
formula, and1 the rest are for the parameters of the formula. The intended interpretation of 
c& is best ilhlstrated by example: informally speaking, &,, ([departure-time(train,3:15)1) 
means that the user believes that the train departs at 3: 15. The intended interpretation of 
3xc&,,( [departure-time(train,x)l ,x) is that the user believes that the train departs at some 
time. 
Definition 4 (ReguZarformuZas). Let C, be a first-order language as defined above. Then 
the reguZarJormuZas, R, are the smallest subset of C, such that: 
(1) Any atomic formula of CO is a regular formula. 
(2) If ~0 and I++ are regular formulas and x is a variable, then p A @, cp v I/J, rp -+ +, -(p, 
Vxq and 3xy~ are regular formulas. 
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(3) If ye is a regular formula whose free variables are just x1, . . . , Xk, ’ and a is a 
constant symbol, then oak+’ ([(p] , x1, . . , Xk) is a regular formula. 
We can now state the result of des Rivieres and Levesque [6]. 
Theorem 3. 
(1) For some consistent theory r of La, (Q”] U K(RS) 2 r. 
(2) For some theory r of& and sentence y? of Lc,, f If cr([Q’l) + a([$l) and 
{ QN) U B(R’) E r . 
Thus, the problems discovered by Montague and Thomason arise if their axiom schemes 
are instantiated with all sentences of La, but they do not arise if these schemes are 
instantiated with just the regular sentences. 
As far as it goes this result is very nice, but one might hope that it can be extended from 
the regular sentences to some more inclusive set. This is because quite straightforward 
matters cannot be expressed using regular sentences. Sentences that quantify over the 
propositional objects of knowledge and belief are a case in point. For example, to provide a 
query-answering system with the knowledge that the user believes that the system believes 
what the system says, we might wish to write in the knowledge base some sentence such 
as: ause& [Vx(utter(system, x) + aSystem(x)J). While the syntax of C, allows us to write 
this sentence, though, as things stand there is no guarantee that the system will be able to 
use it to make desirable inferences. This is because the sentence Vx(utter(system, x) + 
cllSYStem(x)) quantifies over propositional objects, and is therefore not regular, The result of 
des Rivieres and Levesque does not allow us to instantiate the axiom schemes of Montague 
and Thomason with it, or with any sentence of which it is a subformula. For a simple 
example of an inference that for this reason cannot be made, suppose that in response 
to a query the system utters: departure_time(train,3:15) (or an equivalent in English). 
Afterwards, the system ought to be able to infer that the user believes that the system 
believes what it has just said: a,,,,( ] osystem( [departure-time(truin,3: 15)])]). Now, it can 
be seen that this sentence can be inferred from o user( rp’XWter(v~tem, x) + +h&>>l> 
together with the fact that the user believes that the system has uttered the sentence in 
question, CY~,,,( [utter(system, [departure-time(train,3: 15)])1), provided the schemes of 
Thomason are instantiated in the system’s knowledge base with a sentence of which 
Vx (utter(system, x) + czSYStem(x)) is a subformula. (Which instantiations are needed is 
left as an exercise.) But the theorem of des Rivieres and Levesque offers no guarantee 
that the necessary instantiations can be written in the knowledge base without introducing 
inconsistency. 
In the following Section 4 we characterize a set, more inclusive than the regular sen- 
tences, which includes sentences that quantify over propositional objects of knowledge and 
belief. Then we generalize Theorem 3, showing that the schemes characterizing knowledge 
and belief can without paradox be instantiated within this set. This generalization, together 
with a further generalization in Section 5, does guarantee that the instantiations needed for 
the above inference can consistently be written in a knowledge base. 
6 In this case we write “cp(xl, , q)“. 
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4. A less partial solution 
To begin we must once again slightly extend L,. We add to L, the new monadic 
predicate symbols T and P. Also, in addition to the variables x, x1, x2, . . . , y, . . . , we 
add a countable stock of new variables X, Xl, X2, . . . , Y, . . . . 
Intuitively speaking, the symbol P will pick out (Godel numbers of) sentences of &; T 
will pick out true sentences. The following definition concerns the promised set, to which 
we shall generalize Theorem 3. 
Definition !j (Regular formulas with propositional quantijkation (RPQ)). The RPQ 
formulas are the smallest set such that: 
(1) Any atomic formula of LO is an RPQ formula, as is T(X), for any (new) variable X. 
(2) If q and @ are RPQ formulas and x is an (old) variable, then p A @, ye v I@, cp + @, 
-(D, ‘Vxq~ and 3xq are RPQ formulas. 
(3) Ifdxl, . . .,Xk, xl,. .., Xl) is an RPQ formula, and a is a constant, then 
a,k+‘+‘(r4pl,xl,...rxk,Xl,...,X1) 
is an RPQ formula. 
(4) If cp is an RPQ formula then VX(P(X) + (p) and 3X(P(X) A ID) are also RPQ 
formulas, where X is a (new) variable. 
It is easy to see that all regular formulas are RPQ. The RPQ part of C, is more expressive 
than the regular part, though, since there are RPQ formulas that, intuitively speaking, 
quantify over propositional objects. For example, 
VX(P(X) + (utter(system, X) + ~$,,(YT(X>l, XI)) 
is an RPQ representation of the claim, discussed in the previous section, that the system 
says only what it takes to be true. This sentence can be further embedded. Thus 
~~,,rI(pqpw) -+(utter(vtew -JO + ~~y,te,(V'(X)13 X>>)l) 
is an RPQ representation of the claim that the user believes that the system does this. Again 
3X(?‘(X) A a&,, (rT(W1a-V -TV)) 
is an RPQ representation of the claim that some of the user’s beliefs are false. This too can 
be further embedded. Thus 
(yAser( [3x(p(x) AaL (P(X)1 1 X) A .+TO)l) 
represents the user’s belief in his doxastic fallibility. 
We shall now show that the axiom schemes characterizing knowledge and belief can 
safely be instantiated with RPQ sentences. 
Theorem 41. 
(1) For some consistent theory r of La, { Q”} U K(RPQS) c f. 
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(2) For some theory r of L, and serztence + of L,, f tf cx(rQ”l) -+ at([lfrl) and 
IQ”1 u WW27 G r. 
Theorem 4 extends Theorem 3 from the regular part of C, to the more inclusive 
RPQ part of &. The upshot is that although according to Theorems 1 and 2 we cannot 
unrestrictedly instantiate axiom schemes (i)-(v) within a knowledge base, we can safely 
instantiate these schemes with RPQ formulas, which quantify over propositional objects. 
This is not sanctioned by des Rivibres and Levesque’s earlier result. It allows an automated 
agent to reason about knowledge and belief in useful ways, as illustrated at the end 
of Section 3. Notice that the consistent theory r of Theorem 4 can contain, besides 
instantiations of the axiom schemes with RPQ sentences, other sentences that are not RPQ. 
The point is not that the knowledge base should contain only RPQ sentences. It is just the 
axiom schemes that should be restricted. 
We shall prove Theorem 4 by first establishing a correspondence between the RPQ 
formulas and a language for second-order modal logic [7]. First, though, we need several 
more definitions. The first of these introduces the relevant modal language. 
Definition 6 (The language of q with propositional quantijication).We extend LO to a 
multi-modal language Co by adding, to the vocabulary of LO, for each individual constant 
a of LO, a modal operator I&. We also add the same new variables X, Y, . . . that we 
included in L, . The atomic formulas of La are just those of LO, together with the variables 
x, Y, . . . . Complex formulas are formed using 1, A, q , Vx, 3x, VX and 3X in the usual 
way. 
We shall refer to the formulas of Co by p, q, r etc. This is to distinguish them from 
those of La, to which we refer using q, Q, x etc. Examples of formulas of Lo are: q P(x), 
VXVx( P(x) A X), 3X0X. We shall now turn to the interpretation of LO. Note, first, that 
whereas X, Y, _ . . in interpretations of & were allowed to range over the same domain 
as the variables x, y, . . ., in interpretations of fZo the variables X, Y, . . . will range over 
propositions. These will not be elements of the domain over which the variables x, y, . . . 
range. Instead they will be sets of possible worlds of the models within which we shall 
interpret Lo, 
Definition 7 (Models of Lm). A model for Lo is a tuple (W, R, A, Z) where W is a non- 
empty set of possible worlds, R is a function assigning to each individual constant of ,Cu 
a binary relation on W, and A is an infinite domain of individuals. Z is an interpretation 
function which provides each nonlogical symbol of CD with a suitable interpretation. Thus 
Z associates with each world and individual constant of Cn an element of A, and with each 
world and relation symbol a suitable relation on A. 
We assume that the individual constants are rigid designators: for each u, w E W, 
Z(v, c) = Z(w, c). Therefore, we can simply write: “Z(c)“. We assume furthermore that 
for each a, Ra is an equivalence relation. Thus, all of the Lo models considered below are 
S5 models [4]. 
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We now turn to the evaluation of formulas. A variable assignment h into a model 
(W, R, A, Z) associates with each lower case variable an element of A (i.e., h(x) E A), 
and with each upper case variable a set of possible worlds (i.e., h(X) c W). The truth 
conditions of formulas at possible worlds relative to variable assignments are, leaving out 
the standard clauses, as follows: 
Definition 8 (Truth conditions in LO models). 
l M,w~=~~p[h]iffVv~WsuchthatR,(w,v),M,v+p[h]; 
l M, w I= X[h] iff w E h(X); 
l M, w I= VXp[h] iff for all W’ G W, M, w b p[h(X/W’)]; here h(X/W’) is the 
variable assignment which differs from h, if at all, in that h(X/ W’)(X) = W’. 
Propositions, we said, are sets of possible worlds. Letting M be a model of Co and 
letting p be a sentence of &, the proposition expressed by p in M, written IIpIIM, is 
{w I w E W., M, w + p}. We now single out those models in which every proposition is 
expressed by some or other sentence. An ,Cm model (W, R, A, 1) is said to be definite just 
in case for every W’ C W, W’ is expressed by some sentence. Notice that there are a lot 
of definite models. For example, any model with just a single possible world is definite. 
Indeed, any ,& model (W, R, A, 1) that is not definite can be extended into a definite 
model of a :more expressive language. We simply add to J!Z~ a set of new propositional 
constants whose cardinality is at least that of 2w, and interpret these constants in such a 
way as to distinguish between each of the propositions in this set. 
The following translation function now establishes the correspondence between L, and 
Lo that we shall exploit in our result. It maps Lo formulas onto those L, formulas that 
are, modulo substitution of sentences for propositions, their equivalents. 
Definition 9 (Translationfunction). The translation function * from Lo to L, is defined, 
for each p, q E Lo, as follows: 
.P * = p, where p is an atomic formula of LO; 
0 x* = T(X); 
0 (p A q:j* = p* A q”, (p v q)* = p* v q*, (p + q)* = p* + q*, (-p>* = -p*; 
l (Vxp)* = Vxp* and @xp)* = 3xp*; 
l (VXp)” = VX(P(X) -+= p*> and @Xp)* = 3X(P(X) A p*); 
0 (Oap(;cl,...,Xk,X1,...,X~))*=~,k+’+l(rp*l,X~ ,..., Xk,Xl,..., Xl). 
Now, RPQ formulas are just the translations of formulas of Lo : 
Lemma 1. q~ E L, is an RPQ formula ifffor some p E Cm, q = p*. 
Proof. Straightforward induction on the length of (p. q 
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To state the main lemma we use to prove Theorem 4, we first define, for any variable 
assignment h into an & model, an associated set of variable assignments into models of 
L 01’ 
Definition 10 (The variable assignments associated with h). Let h be a variable assign- 
ment of Co into a definite & model M. The set Ah of variable assignments (into a certain 
C, model to be defined below) is: 
( 
For any lower case variable x: f(x) = h(x); 
f for any upper case variable X: f(X) = g(p*), for some sentence p E Cm 
such that Ilpll~ = h(X). 
1 
Now we can state and prove the main lemma needed for the proof of Theorem 4. It 
concerns the construction of an & model which is equivalent, modulo *, to any given 
possible world of a given definite Cm model. 
Lemma 2. For any definite CD model M (= (W, R, A, I)), undfor any world w E W, 
there is a model N of L, such that for any variable assignment h into M, and for any 
p E Lo, M, w I= pW1 e Vf E Ah, N i= p*[f I. 
Using our earlier observation that any model can be expanded into a definite model 
of a more expressive language, it is possible to strengthen this lemma by dropping the 
requirement that M be definite. We shall not go further into this since it is not needed for 
our present purpose. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider a given definite model M = (W, R, A, Z), and world 
w E W. Let the domain of N be A. The interpretation function I of N is as follows: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
Where 0 is any predicate symbol other than P, T or a!‘, and where o is an individual 
constant, I (a) = Z(w, a). 
Z(T) = {g(p*) 1 p is a sentence of Lo and M, w + p}. 
Z(P) = {g(p*) 1 p is a sentence of Cm). 
Z(&+‘+‘) = ((g(p*),&, . . .,&,g(q;), . . ..g(qF)) 1 (lettingxl, . . ..xk. XI, . . .,x1 
be all the variables of p) M, w I= q p[(xl/&), . . . , (-u/&d, (Xllllql II), . . . , (Xl/ 
lkl ll)lI. 
The proof can now proceed with a straightforward induction on the length of p. We 
illustrate by considering the cases p = X, p = VXq and p = q q. 
p = X. We show that M, w k X[h] + Vf E Ah, N + T(X)[f]. 
(=+) Suppose M, w b X[h]. Consider f E Ah. By Definition 10, f(X) = g(q*), for 
some sentence q E Lo such that Ilqljn/l = h(X). Since M, w + X[h], w E ~~q~~~, i.e., 
M, w b q. Thus by the definition of I, N b T(X)[f]. 
(+) Suppose Vf E Ah, N + T (X)[ f 1. Since M is a definite model, there is a sentence 
q f Lo such that ))qJl~ = h(X). Choose f E Ah such that f(X) = g(q*). Since N b 
T (X)[ f 1, g(q*) E Z (T). From the definition of Z (since formulas are recoverable from 
their GSdel numbers), M, w + q . Thus, w E l/q 11~ = h(X) and we can conclude that 
M, w I= WI. 
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p=VXq.WeshowthatM,w~VXq[h]~VfEAh,N~VX(P(X)--,q*)[f]. 
(+)SupposeM,w bVXq[h].Let f l Ahandlet6~ A.Suppose~V+P(X)[f(X/6)]. 
Then, by the definition of I, there is a sentence r E & such that S = g(r*). M, w k 
q[h(X/b-bt)l. A~w f(xl@ E Ah(X/llrllM), since f E Ah. Thus, by the induction hy- 
pothesis, N b q*[f(X/s)]. S ince 6 is arbitrary, N b VX(P(X) -+ q*)[f]. Since f is 
arbitrary, for each f E Ah, N b VX(P(X) + q*)[f]. 
(e=) Suppose Vf E Ah, N + VX(P(X) + q*)[f]. Let P G W. Let f’ E &(x/p). 
There is a sentence r E 15~ such that Ilr 11~ = P, and such that for some f E Ah, f’ = 
f(X/g(r*)). By the definition of Z(P), N b P(X)[f(X/g(r*))], so by the assumption, 
N + q*[f’]. Thus, since f’ was chosen arbitrarily, for each f’ E Ah(x/p), N b q*[f’]. 
By the induction hypothesis, M, w + q [h (Xl P)]. Finally, since P was chosen arbitrarily, 
M, w b VXq[hl. 
p = q q. We assume, without loss of generality, that the free variables of q are 
Xl,. . . , Xk, ;Yl,. . . , X~.WeshowthatM,w~nq[h]eJVfEAh, 
N b tlk+‘+’ (rq*l ,XI 1 . . . , Xk, X1, . . ., Xj)[f]. 
(=k) Suppose M, w + q q[h]. Choose any f E Ah. By Definition 10, f(xi) = h(xi), 
and we can choose r-1, . . . , r-1 E Cm such that f(Xi) = g(rz?) and ]]ri 11~ = h(Xi). Then, 
M, UJ k q q[(xt/f(xt)), . . . , (xk/f(xk)h (Xl/h II), . . . , (&/llnll>l. BY the definition of 
Z, (g(q*), f'w, . *. 9 fh>, g(r;>, . . . , g(rl*)) E Ibk+‘+‘), so 
Since f was chosen arbitrarily, Vf E Ah, N + cxk+‘+’ ([q*l, x1, . . . , xk, Xt , . . . , Xl)[f]. 
(e=) Suppose Vf E Ah, N b cxk+‘+’ ([q*l , x1, . . . , Xk, Xl, . . . , Xl)[f]. Choose any f E 
Ah. Then (g(q*), f(xl), . . . , f(Xk), f(Xr), . . . , f(Xl)) E Z(ak+‘+‘). By Definition 10, 
chooserl,..., r-1 such that (]ri ]]M = h(Xi) and f(Xi) = g(rf). By the definition of I, 
M, u’ k q q[(xl/fh)), . . .v (Xk/fhk))r (Xl/bdl), ...> (&/b-l II)]. 
By Definition lO,h(xi) = f(xi), andbychoiceofri, h(Xi) = IJriI]. ThusM, w /= q q[hl. 
This compbetes the proof of Lemma 2. 0 
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 4. 
Proof of Theorem 4. We shall show, for any definite S5 model M in each of whose 
possible worlds Q” holds true, and for any world UJ of M, that Z%(N) is a suitable theory 
r. Here, N is the & model gotten from M and w by the construction of Lemma 2. i%(N) 
is the set of all sentences that are true in this model. 
Clearly T/I(N) is consistent. Furthermore, since (Q”)* = QN, it is clear by Lemma 2 
that Qw E T/I(N). To complete the proof it remains to be shown that IC(RP@) E L%(N), 
that B(RP@) c TV, and that, say, a( [Q”]) + a( [O = SO]) +! ?“h(N). 
The first axiom scheme of K is a( TV]) + ~0. We shall show, for each (p E RP@, that 
a([~]) -_) q E i%(N). The proofs for the remaining schemes of K and the schemes of 
Z3 are analogous. Let +J E RPP. By Lemma 1 there is some sentence p E Co such that 
v = p*. Since M is an S5 model, M, w b up --f p. So by Definition 9 and Lemma 2, 
o[p*] + [‘p*l E m(N). 
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Finally, we show that a( IQ’]) -+ a( [O = SOI) $Z T/r(N). This is a direct consequence 
of Lemma 2, together with the fact that while M, w k q ( Q”) + ~(0 = SO), (o( Q”) + 
~(0 = SO))* = a( [Q’]) -+ a( ]O = Sol). This completes the proof of Theorem 4. q 
Our result can be extended to languages with modal operators other than 0, with modal 
conditional connectives such as that of Lewis [IO], and with other constructions that can 
be analyzed within possible-worlds models. In the following section, we shall extend it 
instead to a larger fragment of the same language ,!Z,. 
5. An extension 
In the previous sections we characterized sentences that are well behaved, in the sense 
that the axiom schemes corresponding to knowledge and belief can without paradox range 
over them. Regular sentences are well-behaved in this sense and so are RPQ sentences. 
But these characterizations are partial, insofar as there are more inclusive sets of sentences 
within which these schemes can safely be instantiated. In this section we shall extend 
Theorem 4 to one such set. The effect is to extend even further the range of sentences with 
which axiom schemes (i)-(v) can be instantiated within a knowledge base. 
One motivation for this extension is that useful inferences appear to rely on instantiating 
the schemes of Montague and Thomason with certain sentences that are not RPQ. 
For example, the inference discussed at the end of Section 3 relies on instantiating 
with 02([r(X)], [departure-time(truin,3:15)1), if the fact that the system utters only 
sentences that it believes is given the RPQ representation of Section 4. Another 
motivation lies in the observation that some RPQ sentences have the same informal 
interpretations as non-RPQ sentences. Both a( [departure-time(truin,3: 15)1), which is 
RPQ, and a2( [T(X)], [departure-time(truin,3:15)1), which is not, mean, intuitively 
speaking, that the agent believes that the train leaves at 3:15. Now, whereas Theorem 4 
sanctions the instantiation of the axiom schemes of Montague and Thomason with the 
former sentence, it does not sanction their instantiation with the latter. Our extension 
of Theorem 4 sanctions both. It respects such informal equivalences more fully, and it 
illustrates a technique that, we expect, can be used to obtain further extensions of our main 
result. A first step is to generalize the translation function of Definition 9 by introducing 
the following mapping: 
Definition 11 (Translation map). The translation mapping ’ from & to L, is defined, for 
each p, q E Leo. as follows: 
l pe = {p), where p is an atomic formula of Co; 
0 xe = {T(X)}; 
~~~~I~EPe,~~qel,(~p)e=~-IjI~EpeJ; 
l (Vxp)” = {Vxj ) 5 E p”} and (3~p)~ = (3xj I@ E p”}; 
l (VXp)’ = {VX(P(X) -+ $) I j? E p”} and (~XP)~ = {3X(7’(X) A j?) I j? E p”); 
l (na(P)Y = bA(rid> I b E ~“1 w&rwm riv I$ E ~~1; 
l (0dph ,... 42,x1 ,... ,xl>>)e={~~+z+l(r~i,xl ,..., xk.xl ,..,, mibw7. 
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It is easy to see that for any p E Cm, p* E pe. That is, the mapping e is a generalization 
of the function *. We next show that it is well behaved. 
Lemma 3. For any p, q E Cm, if p # q, then pe n qe = 0, i.e., a formula is recoverable 
from each cf its translations. 
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of p and q. 
Base case: If p and q are different atomic formulas, then pe II qe = {p} II {q} = 0. 
Inductive case: If the outer most logical connectives of p and q are different, the claim 
is clear from the definition of e. 
Suppose the hypothesis is true for ~1, pz,ql, q2 E CD. 
l p = pi A p2 and q = ql A 42: If p # q, then either (i) p1 # 91, or (ii) p2 # 42. 
Letting p E pe and @ E qe, we have 40 = ~1 A ~2 and $ = et A $2, for some ~1 E py , 
~2 E I$, $1 E qf’ and @2 E 4;. If (i), then by the induction hypothesis p; f~ q: = 0, 
so ~1 :f $1. If (ii), then by the induction hypothesis p$ fl qg = 0, so ~2 # 142. Either 
way, 9 # *. 
The proof for the other connectives is similar. We will present the case of 0. 
l Letp=Opl,q=Oql,~opeand~rqe.Ifp#qthenpl#q~.Thus,wehavefor 
some jol E p;, and +crl E qfV (i) v = a~Unl> or (3 v =&V'(X>l, Tnl) and (4 
+ =c&W~> or(b) @ =~~WTO1, Ml).It is clear that if (i) and (b) or (ii) and 
(a) then the claim is true. Suppose (a) and (i). Since p1 # 41, then by the induction 
hypothesis, 91 # +l and the claim is clear. Similarly when (ii) and (b). q 
One simlple consequence of the above lemma is: 
Corollary 1. Zf p* E qe, then p = q. 
We are now ready to define an extension of RPQ within which the schemes 
characterizing knowledge and belief can safely be instantiated: 
Definition 12. E = (v 1 for some p E CD, q E p”} 
We first note that E really extends RPQ. RPQ 2 E since for any p E Cm, p* E pe. But 
RPQ# E sinceforanysentencep l &,(r~(rT(X)l, [p*l) E E,buta2(rT(X)1, rp*l) $ 
RPQ. We shall now extend Theorem 4 to E, showing that the axiom schemes characterizing 
knowledge and belief can safely be instantiated with E sentences. 
Theorem 5. 
(1) For some consistent theory r of Ca, { QN} U K( ES) c r. 
(2) For some theory r of C, and sentence @ of C:,, r y u.([Q”l) -+ a( [@I) and 
{Q”]UB(ES)&r. 
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To state the main lemma that we use to prove Theorem 5, we must first revise 
Definition 10. 
Definition 13 (The variable assignments associated with h). Let h be a variable assign- 
ment of & into a definite Co model M. The set A: of variable assignments associated 
with h is: 
I 
For any lower case variable x: f(x) = h(x); 
f 
for any upper case variable X: f(X) = g(q), for some sentence 9 E L, 
such that for some p E Leo, p E pe and 
IIPIIM = h(X). 
We next prove a lemma similar to Lemma 2. 
Lemma 4. For any definite La model M (= (W, R, A, I)), and for any world w E W, 
there is a model N of La such that for any variable assignment h into M, and for any 
P E Lo> M, w k pIhI VP E pe, f E A;, N I= p[f 1. 
Proof. The model N is similar to the one constructed in the proof of Lemma 2. The only 
difference is in the interpretation function I of N, which is now defined as follows: 
(1) Where u is any predicate symbol other than P, T and a’, or CT is an individual 
constant, I (a) = Z(w) a), as in the proof of Lemma 2. 
(2) Z(T) = (g(q) 1 for some sentence p E Lo, (p E pe and M, w k p}. 
(3) Z(P) = {g((p) ( for some sentence p E Cm, p E p’}. 
(4) Z(@+‘) = {(g(q), 61,. . . ,8k, S(@lh . . . , g(h)> 1 for SOme P, 41,. . ., 41 E LO 
(kthg Xl,. . . ,Xk, xl,. . ., Xl be all the variables of p) q E pe, $1 E qf, . . . , @l E 
q,f and M, w I= q p[h/&), . . ., (xk/akh (xl/~~~l Ii), . . .t (xl/h II>]}. 
The proof proceeds by induction on the length of p. We shall illustrate by considering the 
casesp=X,p=VXq andp=nq. 
p = X. q E Xe only if q~ = T(X). We show that M, w b X[h] e Vf E Ai,N + 
T(X)[f I. 
(+) Suppose M, w k X[h]. Consider f E AR. By Definition 13, f(X) = g(e), for 
some~~LC,suchthatforsomeq~L~,~~qeand~~q~~~=h(X).SinceM,w~X[hl, 
44, w t=q.Thus,bythedefinitionof Z,N b T(X)[f]. 
(+) Suppose V f E A:, JV + T (X)[ f 1. Since M is a definite model, there is a sentence 
q E Lo such that llqll~ = h(X). Since q* E qe, it is possible to choose f E AS; such 
that f(X) = g(q*). Since N + T(X)[f], g(q*) E Z(T). From the definition of Z there is 
r E Lu such that q* E re and M, w + r. By Corollary 1, q = r. So, M, w /= q and we 
can conclude that M, w b X[h]. 
p=VXq.WeshowthatM,w+VXq[h]+Vf ~A;;,Ilr~q~,N~Vx(P(x)_,~)[fl. 
(+-) Suppose M, w k VXq[h]. Let f E Ai, @ E qe, 6 E A. Suppose N b P(X)[f (Xl 
S)]. Then, by the definition of I, there are sentences r E Cm, x E La, such that 6 = g(x), 
x E re. By assumption, M, w k q[h(X/llrllM)]. Also, f (X/6) E A&,,,r,,iLIj, since 
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f E A;. Thus, by the induction hypothesis, since t,k E qe, N t= @[f (X/S)]. So, since 6 
is arbitrary within A, N b VX(P(X) -+ $r)[ f]. Since f and I++ are arbitrary within AZ 
and qe, for each f E Ai and @ E qe, N + VX(P(X) + @)[f]. 
(+E) Suppose Vf E Ai, $J E qe, N k VX(P(X) -+ q)[f]. Let P G W. Let f’ E 
A&X,pj. Choose r- E CO such that Ilrllm = P, x E re and f E Ai such that f’ = 
f(X/g(x)). By the definition of Z(P), N t== P(X)[f(X/g(x))]. Choose I/J E qe. By 
the assumption, N b @[f(X/g(x))]. So V+ E qe, N k $[f’], Thus, since f’ was 
chosen arbitrarily within A$c,,,j, Vf’ E A;(,,,), + E qe, N b @[f’]. By the induction 
hypothesis, M, w + q [h(X/ P)]. Finally, since P was chosen arbitrarily, M, w b 
VXq[hl. 
p = q q . There are two cases, (1) and (2), depending on whether q is a sentence. 
(1) Assume that the free variables of q are x1, . . . , xk, X1, . . . , Xl. We show that 
M, w b nqW1 +Vf E A& llr E qeN bk+‘+‘(Wl,~l,. . . ,xk, XI,. . ., Xj>[fl. 
(=k> !3uppose M, w b q q[h]. Choose any f E A:. By Definition 13, f(xi) = 
h(xi),andwecanchooserr,..., rl E Lo and xi E rf such that f(Xi) = &xi) and 
Ilri IIM = h(Xi). Then, 
M, w k q q[(xl/f(xl)), . . . , (-df(wd)3 (Xl/b-l II), . . . , (Xdlhll)]. 
Choose $ E qe. By the definition of I, (g($), f(xl), . . ., f(xl),g(xr), . .., 
g(xdl E I(a k+‘+l), so N + ak+‘+’ ([$I, x1, . . . , Xk, Xl, . . . , Xr)[f]. Since I@ was 
chosen arbitrarily in qe and f was chosen arbitrarily in Ai, Vf E Af;, 1+4 E qe, 
N~rrk+z+‘(rlCrl,xl,...,xk,X1,...,Xl)[fl. 
(e) Suppose Vf E Ai, + E qe, 
N~ak+“+‘(r~l,x~,...,xk,X1,...,X~)[fl. 
Then, since q* E qe, N k cxk+‘+’ (rq*l, x1, . . . , Xk, X1, . . . , Xl)[f 1. Choose any 
f E Ai. Then 
(g(q*), f (-xl), . . ., fbkh f (xl), . . . , f (Xl>) c I(ak+“+‘). 
By Definition 13, choose t-1,. . . , r-l E Lo, x1,. . . , xl E L, such that xi E rf, 
llri 11~4 = h(Xi) and f (Xi) = g(xi). By the definition of Z (since formulas are 
recoverable from their translations), 
M, W k q q[(xdf (xl)), . . ., (xk/f (Xk)), (Xl/lb1 II), . . .t (Xdbdl)]. 
Thus M, w + q q[h]. 
(2) Assume q is a sentence. We first show that: 
Forall~E~~y,NN~1(Tllrl>~NN~2(rT(X)1,rllrl). (1) 
We have: N + o1 (]@]> + (by definition of Z) for some q E Ln such that @ E qe, 
M, w I= q q ts for some q E LO such that @ E qe, M, w + q X[X/11q\[M] u 
(g(T(X)), g(q)> E [(a21 + N I= ~20-W01, i-@l>. Thus, to show that M, UJ b 
q q ++ V+ E qe N + a1 ([+I> and N l= a2( rT(X)l, [+I), it is sufficient to show 
that/M,w~nq~VllrEqe,N~~l(r~l). 
(+-> Suppose M, w b q q . Let I+% E q e. By definition of I, g(e) E Z(a’), so 
N wlwl>. 
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(~)SupposeV~Eqe,N~a1(r~l).Inparticular,sinceq*Eqe,N~=‘(rq*l), 
so g(q*) c Z(a’). Then there is r E Lo such that q* E re and M, w + Or. By 
Corollaryl,q=randsoM,wboq. q 
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 5. 
Proof of Theorem 5. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 4. Here, N is the L, model 
gotten from M and w by the construction of Lemma 4. We show, for example, that Vq E 
~S,N~~‘(~~~)~~.Let~~peforsomep~C~.Then,a’(~~~)~~~(op~p)e. 
Since M, w b up + p, by Lemma 4, N b a1 ([co]) -+ q. The remaining cases follow 
analogously. 0 
6. Conclusions 
Montague [12] and Thomason [16] signal a problem for the notion that the objects of 
implicit knowledge and belief are sentences. They show that paradoxes result when familiar 
axiom schemes characterizing these propositional attitudes are instantiated with certain 
self-referential sentences. 
Des Rivihes and Levesque [6] characterize a class of sentences-the regular sen- 
tences-over which these axiom schemes can safely range. But restricting the schemes 
to regular sentences is a heavy-handed solution. For one thing, regular sentences do not 
quantify over propositional objects, so there are no regular representations of, for example, 
‘the system says only what it takes to be true’ or ‘some of the user’s beliefs are false’. 
We have stated the problems discovered by Montague and Thomason. We have presented 
the solution of des Rivittres and Levesque. We have argued that their solution is incomplete. 
Finally, we have extended it by characterizing a more inclusive class of sentences over 
which the axiom schemes characterizing knowledge and belief can safely range. This more 
inclusive class of sentences includes representations of our example sentences. 
We expect that this result can be further extended, allowing the schemes to range over 
more sentences, though in the light of Theorems 1 and 2 there is a limit to what can be 
done. Maybe in a partial logical setting, within which self-referential sentences can be 
allowed to go without truth values, the axiom schemes can be allowed to range over the 
entire language. But this is not possible in the classical setting that has seemed attractive 
to researchers in artificial intelligence. 
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